Abstract. We characterize four types of agentive knowledge using a stit semantics over branching discrete-time structures. These are ex ante knowledge, ex interim knowledge, ex post knowledge, and know-how. The first three are notions that arose from game-theoretical analyses on the stages of information disclosure across the decision making process, and the fourth has gained prominence both in logics of action and in deontic logic as a means to formalize ability. In recent years, logicians in AI have argued that any comprehensive study of responsibility attribution and blameworthiness should include proper treatment of these kinds of knowledge. This paper intends to clarify previous attempts to formalize them in stit logic and to propose alternative interpretations that in our opinion are more akin to the study of responsibility in the stit tradition. The logic we present uses an extension with knowledge operators of the Xstit language, and formulas are evaluated with respect to branching discrete-time models. We also present an axiomatic system for this logic, and address its soundness and completeness.
Introduction
For logicians of action and obligation, there is little debate as to the intuition that agentive responsibility has an important epistemic component. In interactive settings, what agents know before and after a choice of action needs to be taken into account when ascribing responsibility and/or culpability for an outcome. Aiming to model the different degrees of culpability according to judicial practice with a stit formalism, Broersen introduced in [5] a logic of 'knowingly doing'. Next, a comprehensive study of three kinds of game knowledge (ex ante, ex interim, and ex post ) was provided by Lorini et al. in [15] with the goal of formalizing both responsibility attribution and some attribution-emotions related to it -like guilt or blame. They also used stit for it, just as Horty & Pacuit recently did in [13] , where new epistemic operators are added to basic stit in order to model ex interim knowledge and epistemic ability (or know-how). Even more recently, Horty used in [12] the same novel epistemic operators to provide a logic of epistemic obligations, to which [7] constitutes a reply. Additionally, other attempts to model individual and collective know-how in a stit-like fashion can be found in [17] , where the authors take inspiration from Coalition Logic and use transition systems to account for a given group of agents' ability to bring about an outcome by voting. We mention this in the introduction rather than including it in a section for related work because the present paper has two main objectives, and they both stem from the context of the existing literature in epistemic stit: (1) we want to point out the areas for which the mentioned works overlap, clarifying their differences and shortcomings, and (2) we want to offer new stit formalizations for know-how, ex ante, ex interim, and ex post knowledge, targeting components of them which we believe are essential in an analysis of responsibility.
Within game theory and epistemic logic, there is a degree of agreement regarding characteristics of the four kinds of knowledge we have mentioned. In broad terms, these characteristics are the following. Ex ante knowledge concerns the information that is available to the agents regardless of their choices of action at a given moment. It is commonly thought to be the knowledge that the agents have before they choose any of their available actions and execute them. Ex interim knowledge can be seen as the knowledge that is private to an agent after choosing an action but before knowing the concurrent choices of other agents. Ex post knowledge concerns the information that is disclosed to the agents after everybody reveals their choices of action and executes them. Know-how concerns the epistemic ability of bringing about a particular outcome.
The paper is structured as follows. Since the logic we favor is an extension of Xstit ([6] , [23] ), in section 2 we deal with the examples that motivated our choice of syntax and semantics and introduce these two aspects of the logic. In section 3 we present the definitions for ex ante, ex interim, ex post knowledge, and know-how that we want to formalize and give their characterizations as formulas built with specific combinations of the operators in our language. We compare these new interpretations with the previous ones by dissecting the examples from the preceding section. In Section 4 we introduce an axiomatic system for the developed logic and mention its soundness and completeness results, after which we conclude.
An Example Involving Four Kinds of Game Knowledge
We intend to give a formal overview for settings of interactive decisions. Different agents will have different epistemic status and they can act concurrently. This means that our models include the layouts of formal games with incomplete and imperfect information, 3 as well as of concurrent game structures (CGS's) (see [1] , [4] ) and epistemic transition systems (see [17] , [16] ). Consider the following example, built as a variation of Horty's puzzles for epistemic ability ([13] ) and inspired by the film Mission: Impossible 6. Example 1. A bomb squad consisting of three members (ethan, luther, and benji) faces a complex bomb situation. Terrorists threaten to blow up a facility with two bombs (L and B) remotely connected to each other. If the squad defuses one bomb before the other, then the latter is programmed to set off. The terrorists who planted the bombs start a countdown. If the countdown ends both bombs go off. Each bomb has a remote activation system with two main wires, a red one and a green one. Morevoer, each bomb has its own detonator, and these detonators include a fail-safe mechanism that makes it possible for the bombs to be disarmed. The squad figures out that there are three ways to successfully defuse the two bombs: (1) If they activate the fail-safe mechanisms of both detonators, the squad needs to cut both red wires simultaneously. (2) If they manage to activate the fail-safe mechanism for the detonator of bomb L but not of bomb B, they need to cut the red wire of L and the green one of B simultaneously. (3) The reverse situation of the above item in case they only manage to activate the fail-safe mechanism for the detonator of bomb B. In other words, cutting the red wire of a bomb without the previous activation of the fail-safe mechanism in its detonator makes it go off. Cutting the green wire with previous activation of the fail-safe mechanism also makes it go off. If neither fail-safe mechanism is activated, both bombs go off. If any of these bombs goes off, the explosion is so powerful that it is impossible to ascertain which bomb went off or if both did.
After the countdown starts, agent ethan is commissioned with the task of retrieving the detonators. Agents luther and benji have to afterwards synchronize the cutting of wires in order to disarm bombs L and B, respectively. A malfunction in the squad's telecom gear causes for them to lose all communication with each other, so luther and benji do not know whether ethan has retrieved one detonator, both of them, or none. Regardless, they know that they need to synchronize the cutting of both bombs' main wires just before the countdown ends. We explore the following alternatives: a) Unbeknownst to luther and benji, ethan succeeds in retrieving only the detonator for bomb B. They synchronize the cutting of the wires, and since it is statistically better for both luther and benji to cut the two red wires, they do so. Bomb L goes off. b) Unbeknownst to benji, luther finds out what ethan did. However, luther is actually an undercover associate of the terrorists, so he decides to go on with the cutting of the red wire so that bomb L goes off.
It is convenient to have visual representations of our examples, and stit logic allows us to draw diagrams of them when seen as models. In order to be precise about such models, we introduce the syntax and semantics of the stit logic that we will use before addressing the diagrams. As mentioned before, it is an extension of Xstit logic.
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Definition 1 (Syntax KXstit). Given a finite set Ags of agent names and a countable set of propositions P such that p ∈ P and α ∈ Ags, the grammar for the formal language L KX is given by:
ϕ is meant to express the 'historical necessity' of ϕ (♦ϕ abbreviates ¬ ¬ϕ). X is the 'next moment' operator and Y is the 'last moment' operator.
[α]ϕ stands for 'α sees to it that ϕ'.
[Ags]ϕ stands for 'the grand coalition Ags sees to it that ϕ'. K α is the epistemic operator for α. Observe that L KX is built with the instantaneous action operators [α] and [Ags] . We have done so because this expressive language simplifies the axiomatization process for our logic. However, we restrict our treatment of the four kinds of agentive knowledge to 'actions that take effect in the next moment', which are characterized by formulas of the form [ X (see [23] for a similar approach of the matter). As for the semantics, the structures with respect to which we evaluate the formulas of L KX are based on epistemic branching discrete-time frames.
Definition 2 (Epistemic branching discrete-time (BDT) frames). A tuple of the form T, ⊏, Choice, {∼ α } α∈Ags is called an epistemic branching discrete-time frame iff -T is a non-empty set of moments and ⊏ is a strict partial ordering on T satisfying 'no backward branching'. Each maximal ⊏-chain is called a history, which represents a way in which time evolves. H denotes the set of all histories, and for each m ∈ T , H m := {h ∈ H; m ∈ h}. Tuples m, h are called situations iff m ∈ T , h ∈ H, and m ∈ h. We call the frames 'discretetime' because (T, ⊏) must meet these requirements: a) For every m ∈ T and h ∈ H m , there exists a unique moment m +h such that m ⊏ m +h and 
or 'independence of agency': a function s on Ags is called a selection function at m if it assigns to each α a member of Choice m α . If we denote by Select m the set of all selection functions at m, then we have that for every m ∈ T and s ∈ Select m , α∈Ags s(α) = ∅ (see [3] for a discussion of the property).
5 Observe that these definitions, coupled with the fact that histories are linearly ordered, imply that for every m ∈ T and h ∈ Hm, m −h +h = m and m +h −h = m.
-For each α ∈ Ags, ∼ α is an equivalence relation on the set of situations, meant to express the epistemic indistinguishability relation for α. At this point, the only condition we impose on these relations is (NoF) or 'no forget condition': For every m ∈ T , h ∈ H m , and α ∈ Ags, if m +h , h ∼ α m * , h * , then m, h ∼ α m − * , h * . Definition 3. An epistemic BDT model M consists of the tuple that results from adding a valuation function V to an epistemic BDT frame, where V : P → 2 T ×H assigns to each atomic proposition a set of moment-history pairs. Relative to a model M, the semantics for the formulas of L KX is defined recursively by the following truth conditions, evaluated at a situation m, h :
Satisfiability, validity on a frame, and general validity are defined as usual. We write |ϕ| m to refer to the set {h ∈ H m ; M, m, h |= ϕ}.
With the definitions provided in Definition 3 we can analyze the cases in Example 1 as epistemic BDT models. A diagram for Example 1 a) is included in Figure 1 . The diagram represents the different possibilities in which time may evolve from the point the bomb squad sets out to defuse the bombs onward. Each history stands for one of these relevant possibilities, according to the actions taken by the agents. We take d L and d B to denote the propositions 'bomb L detonates' and 'bomb B detonates', respectively, and we abbreviate d L ∧d B with d. We take s to denote the proposition 'the bombs are defused'. These are true or false depending on the moment/history pair of evaluation. For instance, at situation m 2 , h 4 the bombs have not detonated (M, m 2 , h 4 |= ¬d L ∧ ¬d B ), but in the next moment they have (M, m 9 , h 4 |= d). For clarity, we have labeled the actions available to the agents within the choice partitions of each moment. Label D L+B stands for 'activating the fail-safe mechanism of both detonators' (similarly for D L and D B ), F stands for 'failing to secure a detonator', R L (R B ) stands for 'cutting the red wire of bomb L (B)', and G L (G B ) stands for 'cutting the green wire of bomb L (B)'. In epistemic BDT models all agents in Ags get to choose from their 'available' actions at every moment/history pair. In our example, Ags is made up of ethan, luther and benji. However, luther and benji cannot choose anything at moment m 1 , so we take it that their available actions both lie within the trivial partition, meaning that Choice The frame condition independence of agency makes the partitions-layout look like a game in normal form, modelling concurrent choice of action. Observe that although this example presupposes that there is a single next state per action profile, this need not be the case for the general models.
DL+B DL DB F m1
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In both cases a) and b) of Example 1, at moments m 2 , m 3 , m 4 , and m 5 the available actions for luther are either R L or G L , and the available actions for benji are either R B or G B . A given outcome will ensue according to which action profile is chosen by Ags -at these moments, only luther and benji's choices are relevant. For example, let us suppose that at moment m 4 , benji cuts the red wire (he chooses R B ), and luther chooses to cut the green one (he chooses G L ). This means that we constrain H m4 to {h 9 }, where the bombs are defused. In this case, the semantics in definition 3 implies that M, m 4 , h 9 |= [Ags]
X s. As examples of formulas involving traditional Xstit operators, we have that
In this paper we are concerned with the epistemic structure of the agents and with what it says about (a) their knowledge through the different stages of choice of action, and (b) what they are able to knowingly do. The epistemic structure is given by the indistinguishability relations. In Figure 1 we represent luther's indistinguishability relation in Example 1 a) with blue dashed lines. We focus our study on the epistemic structures of luther and benji, since it is only because of them that cases a) and b) of Example 1 are different. Although ethan 6 Models that satisfy the condition that for every m ∈ T and h ∈ Hm, if h ′ ∈ Choice is also endowed with an indistinguishability relation over the set of situations in our BDT structure, we omit its analysis. The explanation is the following. At moment m 1 luther (and benji, for that matter) does not know what ethan does. At moments m 2 , m 3 , m 4 , and m 5 , we observe that luther is able to distinguish between either cutting the red or the green wire of his bomb. If we take the proposition r L to mean 'the red cable has been cut in bomb L', then we have
X ¬r L for i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} and h ∈ H mi .
7 So in this example we assume that luther (and benji) knowingly performs his available actions in the sense of knowingly performing the actions labeled by R L and G L . However -and this is essential in our treatment of knowledge-this is not mandatory for all our frames. Observe that our example still accounts for the possibility that agents bring about certain outcomes without knowingly doing so. In Example 1 a), we have that
there is no way in which luther knowingly sets a bomb off). At moments m 6 -m 21 , although the fate of the bombs has been decided, agents may still be uncertain about the exact cause of the explosion in the cases where luther and benji have not both cut the green wire of their respective bomb. We use the epistemic structures of the agents at these moments in order to illustrate instances of ex post knowledge. Observe, for example, that M,
3 Ex Ante, Ex interim, Ex Post, and Know-how
Recent trends in modelling responsibility by way of 'knowingly doing' and epistemic ability ('know-how') base these two notions on the differential knowledge across the stages of decision making. In this section we describe diverse interpretations that authors have given in the past to the four kinds of knowledge, and we compare them with our own versions. As mentioned in the introduction, we have two goals in mind. One is to clarify overlapping intuitions for the work done in epistemic stit and address the shortcomings of previous analyses. The other is to present new formal characterizations that we believe are more akin to modelling responsibility with stit.
As we see it, we are modelling agents' uncertainty in strategic interaction. The branching-time theory and language of action that lies at the heart of stit allows us to do this neatly, being flexible enough to address different angles of agentive uncertainty. For this work we discern the following levels of uncertainty, in clear correlation with the four kinds of knowledge: The essence of our criticism to previous proposals also underlies what we strive for the most in our semantics: flexibility. We want for the epistemic stit models to be flexible enough to address both coarse-and fine-grained kinds of uncertainty in interactive settings.
Ex ante knowledge. It is commonly thought of as the kind of knowledge that an agent has regardless of its choice of action at a given moment (see [15] , [2] ). Previous renditions of the concept in epistemic stit all try to model this quality, but from somewhat different viewpoints. To illustrate the knowledge that we intend to formalize, consider our Example 1. In case a), at situation m 4 , h 10 -which we have taken as an actual situation-neither luther nor benji has ex ante knowledge that ethan activated the fail-safe mechanism in the detonator for bomb B. In case b), on the contrary, luther does know it ex ante. Therefore, we favor the view that if an agent has certainty about previous actions, it is easier for that agent to discern things ex ante.
Lorini et al. present in [15] an epistemic stit logic with three operators for ex ante, ex interim, and ex post knowledge: K
They base the semantics of all three of them on primitive epistemic indistinguishability relations for ex ante knowledge. The respective intersections of these relations with those of individual and collective action -themselves resulting from a structure of action labels-yield then Lorini et al.'s versions of ex interim and ex post knowledge. Their treatment follows game theory's natural assumption that ex interim knowledge refines ex ante, and that ex post knowledge in turn refines ex interim. We can safely suppose that this is the reason why they take the semantics for ex ante knowledge as the starting point of all three. Although the main problems with Lorini et al.'s system will be discussed when we deal with ex interim knowledge, we mention here that the fact that the authors do not enforce any connection between ex ante knowledge and historical necessity poses a problem for identifying what an agent knows ex ante with the knowledge that is present regardless of that agent's choice of action. In other words, Lorini et al.'s system admits situations in which at a given moment and along a given history an agent knows ϕ ex ante, but if the agent 'changes' its choice of action then it would stop knowing ϕ (in Lorini et al.'s logic, K It is only under the light of their full systems that we find fault in both approaches, which we address when dealing with ex interim knowledge and know-how.
Our version: We take α's ex ante knowledge to be all the truths about the next moment that, regardless of its current choice of action, α knows to be independent of that choice of action. Let M = T, ⊏, Choice, {∼ α } α∈Ags be an epistemic BDT frame and ϕ of L KX . We say that at situation m, h , α has ex ante knowledge of ϕ iff M, m, h |= K α Xϕ. For instance, we can see that in our Example 1, if we again take f B to denote the proposition 'the fail-safe mechanism of bomb B has been activated', we get that M, m 4 , h 10 |= K luther XY f B for case a), and that M, m 4 , h 10 |= K luther XY f B for case b).
Two points must be made. First, we observe that we have modelled an individual version of ex ante knowledge, with no explicit mention of whether there is a collective counterpart or whether ex ante knowledge is already collective in nature from the start. There is a sense in which ex ante knowledge has been thought as strictly non-private information. Aumann & Dreze, for instance, state that at the ex ante stage of differential information environments, no agent should have any private knowledge ( [2] , p. 80). This entails that ex ante knowledge should then be seen as an instance of group knowledge. Above we studied an individual version, and we then model Aumann & Dreze's ex ante knowledge with C Xϕ, where C stands for the operator for common knowledge for the grand coalition Ags in the language L KX . Second, Duijf points out in [8] (Chapter 3) that it is important to account for the temporal dimension of ex ante knowledge, where this is seen as the knowledge that agents have before they and the others engage in choices of action. Our account does acknowledge such temporal dimension insofar it is given within Xstit logic, and thus the information that agents have ex ante is available before the effects of choices of action take place.
Ex interim knowledge. It is assumed that at the ex interim stage of decision making, an agent's available information expands its ex ante knowledge by taking into account its choice of action, though not yet the other agents' ones. If an agent knows ϕ ex interim, then the agent is certain about the fact that ϕ will occur after the performance of its choice of action and regardless of what other agents choose. For instance, in Example 1 b) luther knows ex interim that bomb L will go off after he chooses R L . We side by the intuition that if an agent has some certainty about the effects of its own actions, then it is easier for that agent to discern things ex interim.
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For Lorini et al., the information available to an agent ex interim is not only independent of the other agents' choices of action, but also must make agents discern which action they are taking. This means that in Lorini et al.'s formalization agents will always be able to know ex interim the action they perform and can never be uncertain at the ex interim stage about the difference between actions that have different labels. The condition can be expressedin the terminology of [15]-by use of propositional constants representing the execution of action labels: if for every action label A and α we take p α A to denote the proposition 'The action A is performed by α', then the following formula is valid in Lorini et al.'s system:
Although the property is to a certain extent in keeping with epistemic game theory, we find it constraining in the context of epistemic stit. For instance, in Example 1 we may want to model a situation in which ethan does not know the difference between detonator L and detonator B but still activates the fail-safe mechanism of one of them. We would like to say that in this case ethan is not able to discern ex interim whether he chose to activate the mechanism for bomb L or for bomb B, but according to Lorini et al.'s formalization this would be impossible. The constraint is all the more problematic because of its consequences for Lorini et al.'s treatment of responsibility/culpability attribution: in their formalism, agents will always be morally responsible for performing a given action, without being able to excuse themselves from moral responsibility by claiming that they were uncertain about which action they chose. Observe also that the constraint implies that ex ante certainty of the present moment forces agents to know all the consequences of their actions, so options for modelling excusability are restricted.
In [13] Horty & Pacuit work with similar ideas to Lorini et al.'s when it comes to the relationship between ex interim knowledge and action labels. With the goal of disambiguating the sense of epistemic ability from that of causal ability in stit, they base a version of know-how on novel semantics for ex interim knowledge. In order to deal with both ex interim knowledge and know-how, Horty & Pacuit extend basic stit with syntactic and semantic components. Syntactically, they introduce the operator [. . . kstit] to encode agentive ex interim knowledge and add it to a language that includes operators K α for epistemic indistinguishability, operators [α stit] for the traditional Chellas-stit notion of action, and for historical necessity. The semantics for formulas involving [. . . kstit] uses action types under the premise that actions of the same type might lead to different outcomes in different moments. At a given moment and along a given history, α knowingly sees to it that ϕ iff at all moments that are epistemically indistinguishable for α to the one of evaluation, α's execution of the same action type enforces ϕ.
10 As mentioned in [7] , the use of types brings three unfavorable constraints: (1) In order for [. . . kstit] to be an S5 operator, the primitive epistemic indistinguishability relations -those supporting the operators K α -must ensue not between moment-history pairs but between moments. This limits the class of models to those in which knowledge is moment-dependent and for which agents will not be able to know that they perform a given action.
11 This leads Horty & Pacuit into identifying K α ϕ with α's ex ante knowledge of ϕ, but then a shortcoming is that both instances of knowledge (K α and [α kstit]) satisfy what we call the 'own action condition' (OAC). This condition is semantically stated by the following rule: for every situation m * , h * , if m * , h * ∼ α m, h for some m, h , then m * , h
In Horty & Pacuit's formalism, then, there is no sense whatsoever in which agents
where Lblα is a function that maps a situation to the action type of the action token being performed at that situation, and Exn m ′ is a partial function that maps types to their corresponding tokens at moment m ′ . 11 Horty & Pacuit's models satisfy the following constraint: if m, h ∼α m ′ , h ′ , then m, h * ∼α m ′ , h ′ * for every h * ∈ Hm, h ′ * ∈ H m ′ , which, under reflexivity of ∼α, corresponds syntactically to the axiom schema Kαϕ → ϕ.
can know more than what they bring about.
12 (2) Just as with Lorini et al., the semantics for [. . . kstit] entails that agents cannot have uncertainty about the actions they perform at the ex interim stage. (3) Indistinguishable moments must offer the same available types.
13 The problem with this constraint, which we call 'uniformity of available action types' (UAAT), is technical in nature: it cannot be characterized syntactically in their logic without producing an infinite axiomatization. This is due to the fact that performing a certain action type can only be expressed syntactically with propositional constants. First, their versions of knowledge -both static and dynamic-satisfy (OAC), so again there is no sense in which agents can know more than what they bring about. Second, they restrict to situations for which agents cannot be uncertain about the actions they choose. Lastly, they favor a condition of uniformity that corresponds to Horty & Pacuit's (UAAT).
In [8] , Duijf has an interesting proposal that somewhat resembles Herzig & Troquard's. Duijf thinks that a primitive indistinguishability relation that links moment-history pairs in instantaneous stit characterizes a kind of knowledge that we may already call ex interim. What distinguishes his interpretation from Herzig & Troquard's -as well as from Horty & Pacuit's, for that matter-is that Duijf's ex interim knowledge is flexible enough to deal both with cases of uncertainty about one's action (it is not the case that agents must know their actions ex interim) -which accounts for possibility of a more coarse-grained knowledge-and with cases for which agents know more than what they bring 12 To see how this constraint thwarts an analysis of the interaction between knowledge and action, consider our Example 1, and assume that at moment m4, for instance, we want to say that luther knows in some sense -not in an ex ante or ex interim sense, though-what benji will choose. Therefore, luther should in principle be able to somehow distinguish h9 from h12, and h10 from h11. However, in presence of (OAC), this cannot be the case (see [8] (Chapter 3) for a more elaborate discussion about the undesirability of this property in epistemic stit). 13 In all the treatments of game knowledge that we presently review, virtually nobody disagrees with some version of this constraint. In the case of the approaches from game theory, ATL, and Coalition Logic, the premise is very much related to the concept of 'uniform strategies'. We will address it further when analyzing versions of know-how. It is worth mentioning that Lorini et al. remain vague about the subject.
The examples they present all presuppose the condition, but they do not demand it explicitly or even refer to it. If they were to enforce it, it would bring the same technical problem as in Horty & Pacuit's [13].
about -which accounts for instances of fine-grained knowledge. 14 However, it may be a bit too flexible, for it allows situations in which an agent knows ex interim that another agent is bringing about something that is not settled, which is clearly dependent on the other agent's choice. Denoting Duijf's operator for ex interim knowledge by K α and the traditional Chellas-stit operators by [α], the formula K α [β]ϕ ∧ ¬ ϕ is satisfiable in Duijf's logic. It might be surprising that Lorini et al.'s version of ex interim knowledge also does not satisfy (OAC), so a comparable criticism can be advanced. In fact, their formalism is such that agents could have ex ante knowledge of what other agents are bringing about, something atypical.
Our version: We identify ex interim knowledge with Broersen's notion of 'knowingly doing' ([6]), so that an agent knows ϕ ex interim iff it knowingly sees to it that ϕ happens in the next moment. Thus, let M be an epistemic BDT model and ϕ of L KX . We say that at situation m, h , α has ex interim knowledge
X ϕ. In Example 1 b) we get that luther knowingly sees to it that bomb L goes off, so that he knows ex interim that bomb L will go off (M,
X d L , so that luther in fact sets bomb L off, but not knowingly and thus without ex interim knowledge about it. As for how our notion of ex interim knowledge deals with the constraints that we have criticized in the reviewed literature, we advance two important remarks:
1. We do not impose any condition on the primitive epistemic indistinguishability relations that would exclude uncertainty of one's own action in the ex interim stage, so we allow for cases of coarse-grained knowledge that have clear implications for responsibility/culpability attribution in stit logic. In particular, full certainty about the moment of evaluation does not imply that agents will know the effects of all their current actions. 2. Our system is flexible enough so that agents can in some sense know more than what they bring about. Since we do not impose (OAC) for our traditional knowledge semantics, we account for instances of finer-grained knowledge. However, agents cannot know ex interim more than what they bring about (reflexivity of the primitive indistinguishability relations entails that
X ϕ is valid with respect to the class of our frames).
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Ex post knowledge. At the last stage of information disclosure, it is revealed to the agents which choices of action they engaged in. Game theorists call the knowledge that arises at this point ex post knowledge. This is commonly seen as including facts that hold after constraining the possible histories to the epistemic 14 Duijf does not demand for his models to validate (OAC). However, as we will point out when addressing his formalization of know-how, Duijf does enforce a constraint corresponding to Horty & Pacuit's (UAAT). 15 Comparing our version with Duijf's, we observe that we exclude situations where agents can know ex interim that other agents will see to it that ϕ in the next moment without it being settled that ϕ will hold in the next moment, while we had seen he does not.
X ϕ → Xϕ is valid with respect to the class of our frames.
equivalents of the choice profile of the grand coalition. Although Aumann & Dreze assume that at the ex post stage "all information is revealed to all" ([2], p.80), we take it to mean all information ensuing from disclosing the agents' choices. Game theorists also describe ex post knowledge as the kind of knowledge that can be attained after all the agents have performed their 'strategies', which adds a temporal dimension to the concept and thus increases its ambiguity. In our view, if the agents have some certainty about the effects of joint action, then it is easier for them to know things ex post. In Example 1 a), we consider as instances of ex post knowledge at the actual situation the facts that Ags caused a bomb to go off and did so unknowingly. We do not consider that that it should also be ex post knowledge the fact that actually it was luther who set off the bomb and that it was bomb L.
Out of all the papers that we have reviewed so far, only [15] includes some treatment for ex post knowledge in epistemic stit. There, the relation that provides semantics for formulas involving K
is built by intersecting the primitive relation for ex ante knowledge with the relation for collective action of the grand coalition -itself the intersection of the agents' relations for individual action (see Definitions 2 and 3 for the corresponding semantics of [Ags] X ϕ). A point to be made is that the instantaneous nature of their action semantics fails to make allowance for an analysis of the temporal dimension of this kind of knowledge. For instance, their semantics does not admit situations for which an agent knows ex post that it brought about ϕ without the agent also knowing ex interim that it brought about ϕ (K Our version(s): In our semantics, we propose a version for individual ex post knowledge in the following way. Let M be an epistemic BDT frame and ϕ of L KX . We say that at situation m, h , ϕ is ex post knowledge of
X ϕ. In this way, in Example 1 a) we get that M, m 4 , h 10 |=
(benji does not know even ex post that luther set off bomb L).
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Endowed with our three versions of differential knowledge according to the stages of decision making, we can see how they interact with each other. Complying with the customary game theoretical view, we have that ex post refines ex interim, which in turn refines ex ante. 16 Other interesting cases appear in the non-actual situations where the bombs were defused. In Example 1 a), for instance, if we take fB to denote the proposition 'the fail-safe mechanism of bomb B has been acti-
X fB) (luther and benji realize ex post that ethan secured the detonator for bomb B). Observe that, contrary to Lorini et al.'s formalization, ours does account for cases where an agent knows ex post that it brought about ϕ without knowing ex interim that it would bring about ϕ:
X ϕ is not valid with respect to our frames. Proposition 1. Let M be an epistemic branching discrete-time frame, ϕ of L KX , and α ∈ Ags. We have that
Know-how. When we talk about know-how we refer to the so-called practical or procedural knowledge of an agent that takes 'actions' rather than propositions as content (see [8] , Chapter 3). 17 The intuition is that an agent knows how to do something iff it has the procedural knowledge of bringing about that something. We are not engaging in a circular argument here, for the second statement can be described with precise definitions for 'knowledge', 'action', and 'possibility'. Still and what they can bring about knowingly, on the other. Consider Example 1 and the differences between case a) and case b). In case a), we would like to say that luther and benji do not know how to save the facility. Whether being causally able to perform an action that they know will save the facility is equal to knowing how to save it or not is very much open to debate, but the reader will agree that at least it is necessary for knowing how. from two other kinds of knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance and propositional knowledge (know-that). Setting aside for the moment the concept of knowledge by acquaintance, [8] proposes that the essential difference between know-how and knowthat lies in the content they take. We side by this interpretation, where procedural knowledge concerns actions, and propositional knowledge concerns propositions. Such a disambiguation identifies the concept of know-how that we study with Wang's goal-directed know-how. This is related to the debate introduced by 
18
Our version: Let M be an epistemic branching discrete-time frame and ϕ of L KX . We say that at situation m, h , α knows how to see to it that ϕ iff
X ϕ. So we propose that an agent knows how to see to it that ϕ if it has ex ante knowledge of the possibility of knowing ex interim (or knowingly doing) ϕ.
19 In this way, in Example 1 a) we have that M, m 4 , h 10 |=
X s (luther does not know how to defuse the bombs), whereas in case b) we have that M, m 4 , h 10 |=
Duijf does not comment on such equivalence, whose deduction -in Duijf's systemcomes from the following argument. Turns out to be the case that the validity of
ϕ entails the validity of ♦Kαϕ → Kα♦ϕ in Duijf's logic. This last schema, denoted by (U nif − H), is the syntactic counterpart of a condition that we call 'uniformity of historical possibility', and in light of it we have that
Propositional logic 2, 4. 19 We observe that if we were to incorporate a condition of uniformity of available actions into our logic (as we do in the axiomatization), it would be equivalent to the semantic condition known as 'uniformity of historical possibility' (Unif − H), which says that for every situation m * , h * , if m * , h * ∼α m, h for some m, h , then for every h ′ * ∈ Hm * there exists h ′ ∈ Hm such that m * , h ′ * ∼α m, h ′ . Under this condition, which corresponds syntactically to the schema ♦Kαϕ → Kα♦ϕ, we would have two important consequences: our formula for ex ante knowledge would be equivalent to KαXϕ, and our formula for know-how would be equivalent to ♦Kα [α] X ϕ.
(luther knows how to set off a bomb). Since in both cases, luther ultimately does set off a bomb, we consider case a) as a situation where he should be excused from moral responsibility of the explosion, while case b) is one where he should be held morally responsible for it.
20
Axiomatization
Definition 4 (Proof system). Let Λ be the proof system defined by the following axioms and rules of inference:
-(Axioms) All classical tautologies from propositional logic. The S5 axiom schemata for , [α], [Ags], and K α . The following axiom schemata for the interactions of formulas with the given operators:
For m ≥ 1 and pairwise distinct α1, . . . , αm,
-(Rules of inference) Modus Ponens, Substitution, and Necessitation for the modal operators.
20 Although we focus our comparisons on the previous work within epistemic stit, it is worth discussing some of the approaches to the concept in the epistemic extensions of ATL and Coalition Logic (see [1] , [11]), for the ideas behind the syntax and semantics for know-how in these logics are similar to those of stit. For instance, Naumov & Tao andÅgotnes et al. -in [17] and [1] , respectively-share many intuitions with Horty & Pacuit. The notion of know-how they both formalize is characterized by the statement that an agent knows how to bring about ϕ at a given state s iff there exists a 'strategy' a such that in all states that are epistemically indistinguishable to s for the agent, 'strategy' a will lead to states at which ϕ holds. In other words, an agent knows how to do something if there exists a way for the agent to knowingly enforce ϕ.
[17] and [1] use different interpretations for the word 'strategy'. While in the former the authors refer to an action label in single-step transitions,Ågotnes et al. use the term as is done in ATL, where strategies are functions that assign to each agent and state a pertinent transition. Regardless of the difference, their formalization of know-how depends on the same reasoning: an agent would know how to do ϕ iff there exists a uniform strategy such that at all epistemically indistinguishable states, the transition assigned by the strategy leads to a state at which ϕ holds. In both accounts, we face again the idea of uniformity.
We define Λ n as the axiom system constructed by adding axiom (AgsP C n ) to Λ, where
Following [5] and [18]
, we will show that the axiom system Λ n is sound and complete with respect to the general multi-modal Kripke models, which Payette calls 'irregular' in [18] . However, we conjecture that there is no problem in using unraveling techniques as in [20] to transform these general Kripke models into those of Definition 2 in a truth-preserving way.
Proposition 2. The system Λ n is sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke-exstit n-models.
The proof of soundness is straightforward. For completeness, we proceed in three steps. In the first step, we prove completeness with respect to Kripke models that are super-additive, meaning those for which each action available to Ags is included in an intersection of individual actions but is not necessarily the same as such intersection (see [20] for their exact definition). In the second step, we prove completeness with respect to Kripke super-additive models where the temporal relations are irreflexive. In the last step, we use a technique similar to Schwarzentruber's construction in [20] and Lorini's in [14] to prove completeness with respect to the class of actual models, meaning those for which each action available to Ags is the same as an intersection of individual actions. The full proof is long and technical and can be found in the Appendix A of the present work.
Conclusion
In this work, we carefully reviewed previous renditions of four kinds of agentive knowledge (ex ante, ex interim, ex post, and know-how) in epistemic stit theory. Motivated by examples that demand a notion of flexibility of the epistemic component in analyses of responsibility attribution, we presented a new logic for them. We find that our versions offer a fine background for building a nuanced theory of responsibility based on the influence of knowledge on action and decision. Appendix A Soundness and Completeness of Λ n Remark 1. As some remarks for the axiom system presented in Section 4, we have that -(SET ) and (GA) imply that ⊢ ϕ → [Ags]ϕ, so that (N Ags) and (T ) for [Ags] imply that ⊢ Xϕ → X ϕ, which is a theorem that we will refer to by (N X). -Necessitation of Y and , together with (In2), entails that (N X) implies that ⊢ Y ϕ → Y ϕ, a theorem which we call (N Y ). -Schema (GA) and axiom (AgsP C n ) imply that
which is a theorem that we call (AP C) n . This theorem will encode the fact that at each moment, each agent will have at most n choices of action to decide from. -Necessitation of Y and K α , together with (In2), entails that (N oF ) implies that
Definition 5 (Kripke-exstit frames).
A tuple F = W, R , R X , R Y , Choice, {≈ α } α∈Ags is called a Kripke-exstit frame iff W is a set of possible worlds and 1. R is an equivalence relation over W . For w ∈ W , the class of w under R is denoted by w. 2. R X and R Y are serial and deterministic relations on W that fulfill the following conditions
Choice is a function satisfying the following properties: -It assigns to each α ∈ Ags a partition Choice α of W given by an equivalence relation which we will denote by R α . For w ∈ W , the class of w in the partition Choice α is denoted by Choice α (v). -It assigns to the grand coalition Ags a partition Choice Ags of W such that Choice Ags (v) = α∈Ags Choice α (v) for each v ∈ W . We denote the equivalence relation defining such partition R Ags . Moreover, Choice must satisfy the following constraints:
-(SET) K For every w ∈ W , we have that Choice α (w) ⊆ w for every α ∈ Ags. This implies that the set {Choice α (v); v ∈ w} is a partition of w for every α ∈ Ags, which we will denote by Choice w α . Similarly, it implies that Choice Ags (w) ⊆ w and that the set {Choice Ags (v); v ∈ w} is a partition of w, which we will denote by Choice w Ags .
-(IA) K For w ∈ W , we have that each function s : Ags → P(w) that maps α to a member of Choice w α is such that α∈Ags s(α) = ∅.
For each α ∈ Ags, ≈ α is an (epistemic) equivalence relation on W that satisfies the following constraints: assigns to each atomic proposition a set of worlds. The semantics for the formulas of L KX is defined recursively by the pertinent truth conditions, mirroring Definition 3. If we add a valuation like this to a tuple defining a super-additive frame, we will also refer to the model as super-additive. If we add a valuation like this to a tuple defining an n-frame, we refer to the model as an n-model.
Proposition 3 (Soundness).
The proof system Λ n is sound with respect to the class of Kripke-exstit n-models.
It is clear that each axiom corresponds to the appropriate relational property in the definition of Kripke-exstit n-models. Therefore, the proof of soundness is routine.
A.1 Canonical Kripke-exstit models
We will show that the proof system Λ n is complete with respect to the class of super-additive Kripke-exstit n-models.
The strategy is to build a canonical structure from the syntax.
Definition 7 (Canonical Structure). For n ≥ 1, the tuple
is called a canonical structure for Λ n iff -W Λ = {w; w is a Λ-MCS}. -R is a relation on W Λ defined by the following rule: for w, v ∈ W Λ , wR v iff for every ϕ, ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v. For w ∈ W Λ , the set {v ∈ W Λ ; wR v} is denoted by w.
-R X is a relation on W Λ defined by the following rule: for w, v ∈ W Λ , wR X v iff for every ϕ, Xϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v. For w ∈ W Λ , the set {v ∈ W Λ ; wR X v} is denoted by x[w].
-R Y is a relation on W Λ defined by the following rule: for w, v ∈ W Λ , wR Y v iff for every ϕ, Y ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v. For w ∈ W Λ , the set {v ∈ W Λ ; wR Y v} is denoted by y[w].
-Choice is a function that fulfills the following requirements:
• It assigns to each α a subset of P(W Λ ), which will be denoted by Choice α and defined as follows: let R α be a relation on W Λ such that for w, v ∈ W Λ , wR α v iff for every ϕ, [α]ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v; if we take Choice α (v) = {u ∈ W Λ ; vR α u}, then we set Choice α = v∈W Λ Choice α (v).
• It assigns to the grand coalition Ags a subset of P(W Λ ) denoted by Choice Ags , and defined as follows: let R Ags be a relation on W Λ such that for w, v ∈ W Λ , wR Ags v iff for every ϕ, [Ags]ϕ ∈ w ⇒ ϕ ∈ v; we set Choice Ags in an analogous way to the Choice α .
-For each α ∈ Ags, ≈ α is an epistemic relation on W Λ given by the following rule:
Proposition 4. For n ≥ 1, the canonical structure M for Λ n is a Kripkeexstit super-additive model where the cardinalities of the partitions Choice Ags and Choice α (for every α ∈ Ags) are at most n -therefore an n-model.
Proof. We want to show that W Λ , R , R X , R Y , Choice, {≈ α } α∈Ags is a Kripkeexstit super-additive frame, which amounts to showing that the tuple validates the four items in the definition of Kripke-exstit super-additive frames.
1. It is clear that R is an equivalence relation, since Λ includes the S5 axioms for . 2. Seriality and determinicity of R X and R Y come from the axioms (DET.S.X) and (DET.S.Y ), respectively, by the following arguments. For seriality, let v ∈ W Λ . We will show that z ′ := {ψ; Y ψ ∈ v} and x ′ := {ψ; Xψ ∈ v} are consistent. We show it for z ′ and assume and analogous argument for x ′ . Suppose for a contradiction that z ′ is not consistent. Then there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m } of formulas of L KX such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m } ⊆ {ψ; Y ψ ∈ v} and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ m → ⊥ (a). Now, the fact that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m } ⊆ {ψ; Y ψ ∈ v} means that Y ψ i ∈ v ′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m; by necessitation of Y and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (a) implies that
Let z be the Λ-MCS that includes z ′ , and x be the Λ-MCS that includes x ′ . It is clear that vR Y z and that vR X x. For determinicity, suppose that, besides the existent z and x we showed above, there exist z * and x * such that vR Y z * and vR X x * . We show that z * = z and x * = x. We show it for z * and assume an analogous argument for x * . For any ϕ of L KX , ϕ ∈ z * iff Y ϕ ∈ v iff (using (DET.S.Y )) Y ϕ ∈ v iff ϕ ∈ z. Therefore, z * = z.
Axioms (In1) and (In2) ensure that R X • R Y = Id and that R Y • R X = Id, respectively, by the following arguments. We show that R X • R Y = Id and assume an analogous argument for R Y • R X . Let v ∈ W Λ , and let z be the unique Λ-MCS such that vR Y z. We show that zR X v: assume that Xϕ ∈ z. Axiom (DET.S.X) and the fact that z is a Λ-MCS implies that X¬ϕ ∈ z. Suppose for a contradiction that ϕ ∈ v. Since v is a Λ-MCS, ¬ϕ ∈ v, so that axiom (In1) implies that Y X¬ϕ ∈ v. By definition of z, this implies that X¬ϕ ∈ z, which is a contradiction. Therefore ϕ ∈ v and thus zR X v. In turn, (N X) guarantees that R • R X ⊆ R X • R by the following arguments. Assume that wR • R X v via y. Let z be the unique Λ-MCS such that vR Y z. We have seen that zR X v. Now we show that wR z: assume that ϕ ∈ w. Axiom (In2), axiom (K) for , and necessitation for imply that XY ϕ ∈ w. Axiom (N X) then implies that X Y ϕ ∈ w. By construction, this implies that Y ϕ ∈ y, which in turn implies that Y ϕ ∈ v and thus -by definition-that ϕ ∈ z. Therefore, we have that z is such that wR z and zR X v, which means that wR X • R v. Therefore, we have that
3. Since Λ includes the S5 axioms for [α] (for each α ∈ Ags), we have that R α is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags. We have to show that the condition of super-additivity is satisfied, which amounts to showing that R Ags ⊆ α∈Ags R α . It is clear that schema (GA) entails precisely this: suppose that wR Ags v, and assume that [α]ϕ ∈ w. Because of (GA), this last thing implies that [Ags]ϕ ∈ w as well, so that the supposition that wR Ags v yields that ϕ ∈ v. Therefore, we have that wR α v, but since α was taken arbitrarily, we have shown that R Ags ⊆ α∈Ags R α . We must verify that M validates the constraints (SET) K (IA) K , (NA) K , and (NAgs) K :
ϕ as an axiom schema, we have that for every w ∈ W Λ , Choice α (w) ⊆ w for every α ∈ Ags.
-(IA) K In order to show it, we need two intermediate results: a) For a fixed w * ∈ W Λ , we have that w ∈ w * iff { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } ⊆ w. (⇒) Let w ∈ w * (which means that w * R w). Take ϕ of L Kx such that ϕ ∈ w * . Since w * is closed under Modus Ponens, axiom (4) for implies that ϕ ∈ w * as well. Therefore, by the definition of R , we get that ϕ ∈ w. (⇐) We assume that { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } ⊆ w. Take ϕ of L KX such that ϕ ∈ w * . By our assumption, we get that ϕ ∈ W . Since w is closed under Modus Ponens, axiom (T ) for implies that ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we have that the fact that ϕ ∈ w * implies that ϕ ∈ w, which means that w * R w and w ∈ w * . b) For a fixed w * ∈ W Λ and s : Ags → P(w * ) a function that maps α to a member of Choice w * α such that v s(α) ∈ s(α), we have that
. By our assumption, we get that [α]ϕ ∈ w. Since w is closed under Modus Ponens, the (T ) axiom for [α] implies that ϕ ∈ w as well. In this way, we have that the fact that [α]ϕ ∈ v s(α) implies that ϕ ∈ w, which means that v s(α) R w * α w and w ∈ s(α). Next, we will show that for a fixed w * ∈ W Λ and s : Ags → P(w * ) a function that maps α to a member of Choice w * α such as in item b) above, we have that α∈Ags ∆ s(α) ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } is Λ-consistent. First, we will show that α∈Ags ∆ s(α) is consistent. Suppose that this is not the case. Then there exists a set {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } of formulas of L KX such that [α i ]ϕ i ∈ v s(αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
Without loss of generality, we assume that α i = α j for all j = i such that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} -this assumption hinges on the fact that any stit operator distributes over conjunction. Notice that the fact that
Since w * is closed under conjunction, we also have that
By axiom (IA), we have that
Therefore, equations (2) and (1), imply that
But this is a contradiction, since we had seen that
ϕ n ∈ w * , and w * is a Λ-MCS. Therefore, α∈Ags ∆ s(α) is consistent. Next, we show that the union α∈Ags ∆ s(α) ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ w * } is also consistent. Suppose that this is not the case. Since α∈Ags ∆ s(α) is consistent, there must exist sets {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } and
Let θ = θ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ θ m . Since distributes over conjunction, we have that
where it is important to mention that since w * is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ w * . In these terms, (4) implies that
Once again, we assume without loss of generality that α i = α j for all j = i such that j, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Analogous to the procedure we used to show that α∈Ags ∆ s(α) is consistent, (5) implies that
This entails that ♦¬ θ ∈ w * , but this is a contradiction, since the fact that θ ∈ w * implies with axiom (4) for that θ ∈ w * . Now, let u * be the Λ-MCS that includes α∈Ags ∆ s(α) ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ w * }. By the intermediate result a), it is clear that u * ∈ w * . By the intermediate result b), it is clear that u * ∈ s(α) for every α ∈ Ags. Therefore, we have shown that for a fixed w * ∈ W , we have that each function s : Ags → P(w * ) that maps α to a member of Choice w * α is such that α∈Ags s(α) = ∅, which means that M validates the constraint (IA) K .
By a similar argument to those in the proof of item 2, we know that z ′ := {ψ; Y ψ ∈ o} is consistent. Let z be the Λ-MCS that includes z ′ . As shown also in item 2, it is the case that zR X o. Let us show that vR α z.
which by construction of z implies that ϕ ∈ z. Therefore vR α z, which with the previously shown fact that zR X o implies that vR X • R α o. In this way,
-(NAgs) K It can be shown in the same way as the above item, substituting
[α] for [Ags] and using axiom (N Ags) instead of schema (N A). Finally, we show that card (Choice Ags ) ≤ n. Let w ∈ W Λ . Suppose for a contradiction that card (Choice Ags ) > n. Take pairwise different c 0 , . . . , c n ∈ Choice w Ags , and take w i ∈ c i for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n. According to item 5 of Lemma 1 below, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there must exist ϕ i ∈ L KX such that [Ags]ϕ i ∈ c i and ϕ i ∈ c j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that j = i. This means that 1≤i≤n ¬ϕ i ∈ w 0 (⋆) and that [Ags] 
ϕ k ∈ w 0 , but this is a contradiction to (⋆). 4. Since the axiom system Λ includes the S5 axioms for K α for each α ∈ Ags, we have that ≈ α is an equivalence relation for each α ∈ Ags. We must now verify that M validates the constraints (Unif − H) K and (NoF) K .
-For (Unif − H) K , fix w 1 , w 2 ∈ W Λ . We assume that there exist v ∈ w 1 and u ∈ w 2 such that v ≈ α u. Take v ′ ∈ w 1 . We will show that u ′′ = {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } ∪ { ψ; ψ ∈ u} is consistent. In order to do so, we will first show that {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } is consistent. Suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Then there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KX such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ⊥ (a). Now, the fact that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } means that K α ψ i ∈ v ′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; by necessitation of K α and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (a) implies that
ψ ∈ u} is also consistent. Suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent. Since {ψ; K α ψ ∈ v ′ } and { ψ; ψ ∈ u} are consistent, there must exist sets {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } and {θ 1 , . . . , θ m } of formulas of L KX such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ {ψ;
Since distributes over conjunction, we have that ⊢ θ ↔ θ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ θ m , where it is important to mention that since u is a Λ-MCS, then θ ∈ u and θ ∈ u as well (⋆). In this way, (a) implies that ⊢ ϕ → ¬ θ and thus that ⊢ ♦ϕ → ♦¬ θ (b). Notice that the facts that
Now, this last inclusion implies, with our assumption that v ≈ α u, that ♦ψ ∈ u, which by (b) in turn yields that ♦¬ θ ∈ u, contradicting (⋆). Therefore, u ′′ is consistent. Finally, let u ′ be the Λ-MCS that includes u ′′ . It is clear from its construction that u ′ ∈ u = w 2 and that v ′ ≈ α u ′ , With this, we have shown that M validates the constraint (Unif − H) K .
-(NoF) K Let α ∈ Ags and w, v ∈ W Λ such that w ≈ α •R X v via y. By similar arguments to the ones used in item 2 of this proof, we know that z ′ := {ψ; Y ψ ∈ v} is consistent and that if we take z to be the Λ-MCS that includes z ′ , then zR X v.What remains to be shown is that w ≈ α z: assume that K α ϕ ∈ w. Axiom (In2), schema (K) for K α , and necessitation for K α imply that K α XY ϕ ∈ w. Axiom (N oF ) then implies that XK α Y ϕ ∈ w. By construction, this implies that K α Y ϕ ∈ y, which in turn implies that Y ϕ ∈ v and thus -by definition-that ϕ ∈ z. Therefore, we have that z is such that w ≈ α z and zR X v, which means that wR X • ≈ α v. Therefore, we have that
As is usual with canonical structures, our objective is to prove the so-called truth lemma, which says that for every formula ϕ of L KX and every w ∈ W Λ , we have that M, w ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w. This is done by induction on ϕ, and the inductive step for each modal operator requires previous results (such as the important existence lemmas). These previous results are standard (Lemma 1 below).
Lemma 1 (Existence). Let M be the canonical structure for Λ n . Let w ∈ W Λ . For a given formula ϕ of L KX , the following hold:
[α]ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w such that wR α v. 5.
[Ags]ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every v ∈ w such that wR Ags v.
Proof. Let w ∈ W Λ , and take ϕ of L KX . All items are shown in the same way. Let △ ∈ {X, Y, , [α], [Ags], K α }, and let R △ stand for the relation upon which the semantics of △ϕ is defined. We will show that △ϕ ∈ w iff ϕ ∈ v for every
(⇐) We work by contraposition. Assume that △ϕ / ∈ w. We will show that there is a world v in W Λ such that wR △ v and such that ϕ does not lie within it. For this, let v ′ = {ψ; △ψ ∈ w}, which is consistent by a similar argument than the one introduced in the proof of the above item: suppose for a contradiction that v ′ is not consistent; then there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KX such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n → ⊥ (a); now, the fact that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ means that △ψ i ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n; necessitation of △ and its distributivity over conjunction yield that (a) implies that ⊢ △ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ △ψ n → △⊥, but this is a contradiction, since w is a Λ-MCS which, being closed under conjunction, includes △ψ 1 ∧· · ·∧△ψ n . Now, we define v ′′ = v ′ ∪{¬ϕ}, and we show that it is also consistent as follows: suppose for a contradiction that it is not consistent; since v ′ is consistent, we have that there exists a set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } of formulas of L KX such that {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ v ′ and ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n ∧ ¬ϕ → ⊥, which then implies that ⊢ ψ 1 ∧· · ·∧ψ n → ϕ (b); due to necessitation of △ and its distributivity over conjunction, we get that (b) implies that ⊢ △ψ 1 ∧· · ·∧△ψ n → △ϕ (b); but notice that since w is a Λ-MCS, then △ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ △ψ n ∈ w, so that (b) and the fact that w is closed under Modus Ponens entail that △ϕ ∈ w, contradicting the initial assumption that △ϕ / ∈ w. Finally, let v be the Λ-MCS that includes v ′′ . It is clear from its construction that ϕ / ∈ v and that wR △ v, by definition of R △ .
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Lemma 2 (Truth Lemma). Let M be the canonical structure for Λ n . For every formula ϕ of L KX and every w ∈ W Λ , we have that M, w ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. We proceed by induction on ϕ. The cases with the Boolean connectives are standard. For formulas involving the modal operators, both directions follow straightforwardly from Lemma 1.
Proposition 5 (Completeness w.r.t. super-additive n-models). The proof system Λ n is complete with respect to the class of Kripke-exstit super-additive n-models.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Λ n -consistent formula of L KX . Let Φ be the Λ n -MCS including ϕ. We have seen that the canonical structure M is such that M, Φ ϕ.
A.2 Irreflexive Super-additive n-models
In the next step of our proof of completeness, for each Λ n -consistent formula ϕ of L KX , we will build a super-additive n-model where the 'next' and 'last' relations are irreflexive that satisfies ϕ. First, we introduce some auxiliary terminology. 
-Let T W be the set of all finite sequences w 0 , . . . , w m such that w i ∈ W and m ∈ N ∪ {0}. We define
-We define Choice u so that • For α ∈ Ags, we define R . This follows straightforwardly from the definition of these relations and the fact that R Ags ⊆ R α for every α ∈ Ags.
-Also from definition of R u α we get that (SET) K holds. -For (IA) K , let w 0 , . . . , w m , a ∈ W u and s : Ags → P w 0 , . . . , w m , a be a function that maps each α ∈ Ags to a member of Choice u α included in w 0 , . . . , w m , a . We want to show that α∈Ags s(α) = ∅. For each α ∈ Ags, take w α0 , . . . , w αm , a ∈ s(α). We want to show that there exists v 0 , . . . , v m , a ∈ w 0 , . . . , w m , a such that v 0 , . . . , v m , a R u α w α0 , . . . , w αm , a for every α ∈ Ags. Observe that by definition we get that w αm ∈ w m for every α ∈ Ags. Since M satisfies (IA) K , we have that there exists v * ∈ w m such that v * R α w αm for every α ∈ Ags. We have two cases, according to the value of a: . . , u l , a ′ -which implies that v m ≈ α u l (⋆). Take x 0 , . . . , x m , a ∈ w 0 , . . . , w m , a . This implies that x m ∈ w m = v m , so that (⋆) and the fact that M validates (Unif − H) K entail that there exists y ∈ u l such that x m ≈ α y. The finite sequence given by y −l , . . . , y −1 , y is such that it lies within T W , so that y −l , . . . , y −1 , y, a ′ lies within w ′ 0 , . . . , w ′ l , a ′ , and such that x 0 , . . . , x m , a ≈ • (Case a = 1, m = 0) For R ∈ {R , R α , R Ags , ≈ α }, we have that w 0 , 1 R u v, 1 . For R X , we have that w 0 , 1 R Proposition 8. The proof system Λ n is complete with respect to the class of Kripke-exstit super-additive n-models where the 'next' and 'last' relations are irreflexive.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Λ-consistent formula of L KX . By Proposition 5, we know that there exists a Kripke-exstit super-additive n-model M and a world w in its domain such that M, w |= ϕ. By Proposition 7 and the invariance of modal satisfaction under bounded morphisms, we then have that M u -as defined in Definition 8-is a such that M u , w, 1 |= ϕ, where by Proposition 6 we know that M u is a Kripke-exstit super-additive n-model where the 'next' and 'last' relations are irreflexive.
A.3 Models
In the final step of our proof of completeness, for each Λ n -consistent formula ϕ of L KX , we will build a model that satisfies it. First, we introduce some auxiliary sets and terminology that will allow us to build the model. } to be an enumeration of A− → c with cardinality n (so that repetition is possible). 
